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Abstract
It is well-known that knowledgebases may contain inconsistencies. We provide a framework of measures, based on a first-order
four-valued logic, to quantify the inconsistency of a knowledgebase. This allows for the comparison of the inconsistency of diverse
knowledgebases that have been represented as sets of first-order logic formulae. We motivate the approach by considering some
examples of knowledgebases for representing and reasoning with ontological knowledge and with temporal knowledge. Analysing
ontological knowledge (including the statements about which concepts are subconcepts of other concepts, and which concepts
are disjoint) can be problematical when there is a lack of knowledge about the instances that may populate the concepts, and
analysing temporal knowledge (such as temporal integrity constraints) can be problematical when considering infinite linear time
lines isomorphic to the natural numbers or the real numbers or more complex structures such as branching time lines. We address
these difficulties by providing algebraic measures of inconsistency in first-order knowledgebases.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The need for handling inconsistencies in knowledgebases has been well recognised in recent years. Inconsistencies
may arise for various reasons such as when information sources are merged or in the presence of integrity constraints.
The use of first-order logic becomes problematical because a single (local) inconsistency leads to the (global) incon-
sistency of the entire knowledgebase. Paraconsistent logics allow for local inconsistency without global inconsistency.
Paraconsistent reasoning is important in handling inconsistent information, and there have been a number of proposals
for paraconsistent logics, such as Da Costa’s Cω logics [11], developments of C systems [9], Priest’s three-valued logic
LPm [33], Belnap’s four-valued logic [5], and versions of Belnap’s four-valued logic restricted to minimal models [1],
for reasoning with inconsistent information. Further approaches, such as techniques for analysing and querying incon-
sistent databases and knowledgebases [2,3,12,31], techniques for merging knowledgebases [4,7,27,28], and analytical
techniques for inconsistent software specifications [19], have been proposed (for reviews of some applications see
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provide an adequate way of summarising the nature of the inconsistencies.
Our interest in this paper is in providing a measure for the inconsistency of a knowledgebase represented as a set of
first-order logic formulae. By providing such a measure we can compare different knowledgebases and evaluate their
quality of information. If given the opportunity to choose between different knowledgebases, we may try to choose
the one that is least inconsistent.
Four-valued paraconsistent logics have been used as the basis of an approach to measuring inconsistency in knowl-
edgebases [14,20,21]. In this, each inconsistent set of formulae is reflected in the four-valued models for the set, and
then the inconsistency is measured in the models. This approach to measuring inconsistency has already been seen as
a useful tool in analysing a diverse range of information types including news reports [23], integrity constraints [14],
ontologies [32], software specifications [8,30], and ecommerce protocols [10]. However, this approach of measuring
inconsistency has been restricted to either a propositional language or a language with predicates but without function
symbols.
In this paper, we present a framework for measuring inconsistency for a full first-order language, together with
examples in analysing ontological and temporal knowledge. Dealing with a full first-order language is potentially
important in diverse applications (such as reasoning about specifications [13]), but it does also raise issues with regard
to analysing arbitrarily large, including infinite, domains. To address these issues, our framework provides algebraic
measures of inconsistency in first-order knowledgebases.
2. Overview of our approach
In this section, we provide an informal overview of our approach together with some examples to motivate and
illustrate our approach. We start by recalling that many diverse applications in computer science require the ability to
represent and reason with knowledge in a form that is more expressive than propositional logic. Furthermore, in many
applications, there is a need to analyse inconsistency arising in knowledge.
To illustrate the need for systems and/or users to analyse inconsistency, consider diverse applications such as tools
for analysing formal software specifications (where parts of the specifications may have come from different sources),
systems for disambiguation in natural language processing (where there are conflicting syntactic, semantic, or prag-
matic parses of the text/speech being parsed), and tools for developing ontologies based on description logics (where
there may be multiple ontologies perhaps from multiple sources that need to be combined by an ontology engineer
into a single coherent and consistent ontology). In these examples, and in many other potential applications, there is
either the need for an automatic system to analyse the degree of inconsistency arising in the available knowledge, or
there is the need for a system to provide a user (such as a software or knowledge engineer) with an assessment of the
degree of inconsistency arising in the available knowledge. Once the system/user has access to an assessment of the
degree of inconsistency, the system/user can make a more intelligent and better informed decision on the course of
action to take on the inconsistency.
In this paper we assume a knowledgebase is a set of formulae of classical first-order logic. We impose no restrictions
on this. It can include function symbols, variable symbols, and quantifier symbols. And of course, a knowledgebase
can be inconsistent, and indeed, any formula in a knowledgebase may be inconsistent.
Our approach to measuring inconsistency in a knowledgebase is to consider the “four-valued models” of it. Each of
these models is based on what we call a bistructure, which essentially is a pair of classical interpretations: One of these
interpretations is used for the satisfaction of positive literals (i.e. the atoms), and the other is used for the satisfaction
of negative literals. So in a bistructure, both an atom and its negation, or neither, can be satisfied. This gives a four-
valued semantics, so that an atom may be regarded as being exactly one of “true” or “false” or “both true and false”
or “neither true nor false” in a bistructure. The semantics for more complex formulae is given by a generalisation of
Belnap’s four valued logic, which is a paraconsistent logic that we call tolerant logic. For our purposes, this semantics
is simple and the set of models for any knowledgebase is always nonempty.
Given a bistructure, we apply a simple measure of inconsistency, denoted Inc, that gives the proportion of the tuples
in the bistructure that are in conflict. The amount of conflict in a bistructure is the number of tuples that are both true
and false. This is normalised by the total number of tuples that are possible in the interpretations (which is a function
of the size of the domain), so we get a value in the [0,1] interval. For example, if we have a bistructure with just one
monadic relation R and two domain objects a1 and a2, and the first classical interpretation has both 〈a1〉 and 〈a2〉 (for
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so the proportion of tuples in conflict is 1/2. Note, this measure is not restricted to Herbrand interpretations.
We then generalise this measure of inconsistency to sets of bistructures. In order to set up our framework, and
consider various properties, we deal with sets of bistructures in general. But in practice, if we want to analyse a
knowledgebase, we consider the set of models for the knowledgebase.
For a knowledgebase, since our measure of inconsistency of a model is dependent on the domain size, we consider
the models for each domain size in turn. For each domain size, we find the minimum degree of inconsistency in a
model from the models of this size, using a function denoted MicroInc, and then we summarise this value obtained for
each size in the form of a ratio of univariate polynomial functions (i.e. a rational function) where the variable is the
cardinality of the domain. The polynomial that is the numerator gives the minimum number of tuples in conflict for
the models of domain size n, and the polynomial that is the denominator gives the maximum number of tuples in the
models of domain size n. By representing the degree of inconsistency in the form of such a rational function, we have
a concise summary of the nature of the inconsistency for any domain size. Furthermore, it provides a direct way of
comparing knowledgebases in terms of their respective rational functions.
To illustrate our approach, we now look at examples of knowledgebases to show some of the key aspects of
measuring inconsistency. We start with some simple examples based on pairs of formulae taken from the following
list of formulae (A1)–(A7). For each pair we consider, for example (A2, A3), imagine there are two agents who have
provided the formulae, and these two agents need to jointly provide a formula that they both can agree on. Perhaps
the agents need to do this as part of a requirements capture process for some software system for which the agents are
stakeholders. So each formula represents the requirements of one of the agents. By measuring the inconsistency of
the union of the two formulae, we get a measure of how divergent the two agents are in their positions. Furthermore,
if the agents are negotiating, they may withdraw one or both formulae, and replace them with formulae that are less
inconsistent. Such a negotiation may be undertaken with the aim of finding a pair of formulae that are consistent
together.
(A1) P(a)
(A2) ¬P(a)
(A3) ∀x.P (x)
(A4) ∃x.¬P(x)
(A5) ¬∃x.P (x)
(A6) ∀x.¬P(x)
(A7) ∀x.¬P(f (x))
For the pair (A1, A2), we may describe this as an “atomic conflict” (A1 says one domain object is in the inter-
pretation for P whereas A2 says that one domain object is in the interpretation for the negation of P ). For the pairs
(A2, A3) and (A3, A4), we have something similar to the case for (A1, A2), in that there is at least one domain object
in conflict. So, for each of the pairs (A1, A2), (A2, A3), and (A3, A4), if our knowledgebase contains just the two
formulae in the pair, then we will calculate the measure of inconsistency as the rational function 1/n, and in the limit,
as n goes to infinity, the degree of inconsistency is 0.
For the pairs (A3, A5) and (A3, A6), we have more significant inconsistency. In the models, all domain objects are
in conflict in each pair. So, for each of (A3, A5) and (A3, A6), if the knowledgebase contains just the two formulae in
the pair, then we will calculate the measure of inconsistency as the rational function n/n, and in the limit, the degree
of inconsistency is 1.
For the pair (A3, A7), we have something similar to the pair (A3, A6), but here we also need to consider the
function symbol f in the right formula. If we consider the models with the fewest conflicts (which we will see are the
models we want to base our measures on), then the interpretation of the function symbol should be a constant function,
i.e. there is c ∈ D such that for all d ∈ D, f (d) = c. In this case, there is one domain object in conflict, namely the
c just mentioned. So, for (A3, A7), if the knowledgebase contains just the two formulae in the pair, then we will
calculate the measure of inconsistency as the rational function 1/n, and in the limit, the degree of inconsistency
is 0.
We now consider examples of ontological knowledge. Whilst description logics are now the leading approach
to formalising ontological knowledge, the basic description logics are actually subsystems of classical logic; so it
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the following conventions: (1) A concept P is represented by a monadic predicate P(x); (2) An individual c that
is a member of a concept P is represented by a ground predicate P(c); (3) The relationship that the concept Q is
a subconcept of the concept P is represented by ∀x.Q(x) → P(x); and (4) The relationship that the concept Q is
disjoint with the concept P is represented by ∀x.Q(x) → ¬P(x)∧ ∀x.P (x) → ¬Q(x).
We see a key advantage of our approach for analysing an ontology (when it is under development) if we consider the
need to analyse the structure (i.e. the concepts and their inter-relationships) without knowing about the instances that
may populate it. For example, for a medical records ontology, the ontology engineer should have obtained knowledge
that for example the concept heart surgery is a subclass of the concept surgery, and that male and female are disjoint
concepts, but the ontology engineer cannot be expected to have a list of all the patients of the hospital in the future.
Hence, when the ontology is being developed, the number of instances that will be in the ontology is unknown. Our
approach directly deals with this issue, since we can consider an arbitrarily large number of instances, which we do by
considering an arbitrary-sized domain. In other words, our measure of inconsistency, captured by a rational function,
is a representation of the inconsistency for each domain size.
We start by considering the formulae (B1)–(B4). These formulae are not inconsistent. They say that S is a sub-
concept of R, Q is a subconcept of P , Q and S are disjoint, and P and R are disjoint. However, if we also have the
assumption (B5) that says that there is an instance in S and Q, then we do have an inconsistency.
(B1) ∀x.S(x) → R(x)
(B2) ∀x.(Q(x) → ¬S(x)∧ S(x) → ¬Q(x))
(B3) ∀x.Q(x) → P(x)
(B4) ∀x.(P (x) → ¬R(x)∧R(x) → ¬P(x))
(B5) ∃x.S(x)∧Q(x)
So without knowing anything about the actual membership of these concepts, we can analyse the inconsistency in
this ontological knowledge. For (B1)–(B5), we will see in Example 15, that the rational function is 1/n. This means
that as the size of the domain increases, the inconsistency is diluted, and in the limit, the degree of inconsistency is
reduced to zero.
As another example of ontological knowledge, consider (C1)–(C7) which are inconsistent. For this, we will see
(in Example 17) that the degree of inconsistency is given by the rational function 1/3. So as the size of the domain
increases, the inconsistency is not diluted, and in the limit, the degree of inconsistency is 1/3. Furthermore, if we
compare (B1)–(B5) and (C1)–(C7), for n > 3, the rational function for (C1)–(C7) is always greater than that for
(B1)–(B5), and so we can regard (C1)–(C7) as more inconsistent than (B1)–(B5).
(C1) ∀x.S(x) → R(x)
(C2) ∀x.Q(x) → P(x)
(C3) ∀x.(Q(x) → ¬S(x)∧ S(x) → ¬Q(x))
(C4) ∀x.(P (x) → ¬R(x)∧R(x) → ¬P(x))
(C5) ∀x.(T (x) → ¬U(x)∧U(x) → ¬T (x))
(C6) ∀x.(T (x) → U(x)∧U(x) → T (x))
(C7) ∀x.T (x)∨U(x)
We now turn to temporal knowledge. The following set of formulae (D1)–(D3) is consistent in classical logic but
the set is only satisfied by an infinite model such as one based on the sequence of the natural numbers. Such a set
of formulae may appear as part of a specification for time-stamping locutions in a dialogue protocol between two
interacting agents.
(D1) ∀x,∃y.R(x, y)
(D2) ∀x, y.(R(x, y) → ¬R(y, x))
(D3) ∀x, y, z.(R(x, y)∧R(y, z) → R(x, z))
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is extremely small, and so any bistructure for it is “overwhelmingly consistent”. In contrast, if the following formula
(D5) is added to (D1)–(D3), then the set is inconsistent, and in a sense, the conflict is extremely large, and so any
bistructure for it is “substantially inconsistent”.
(D4) R(1,1)
(D5) ∀x.R(x, x)
In our framework, we will provide a degree of inconsistency to account for inconsistency in infinite models (allowing
us for example to differentiate between the inconsistency in the set {D1, D2, D3, D4}, and the set {D1, D2, D3, D5}),
and explore some of the relationships between them, as well as with the degree of inconsistency for finite models.
We will also provide a measure of the consistency of an infinite model which provides an alternative dimension for
analysing an infinite model.
Since the proposal in this paper is the first proposal for measuring inconsistency in full first-order logic (including
infinite models), our approach offers considerable advantages for applications in artificial intelligence and computer
science involving first-order knowledge. A number of other proposals have been made for measuring the degree of
information in the presence of inconsistency [24,26,29,37], and for measuring the degree of inconsistency in infor-
mation [14,15,17,18,20–22,24–26,36]. All these proposals are based on propositional logic, apart from [15] and [14],
with the former primarily investigating the mathematical structure of various inconsistency measures, while the latter
is based on a restricted form of first-order logic. Furthermore, there are six key improvements in this new paper over
the [14] paper:
1. In [14] we only considered a restricted first-order language with universal and existential quantification but with-
out function symbols (apart from constant symbols) whereas in this paper we consider full first-order logic, and
therefore in this paper we are able to handle a wider range of knowledgebases.
2. In [14] we only considered Herbrand interpretations, whereas in this paper, we consider any first-order interpre-
tation, and therefore we drop some constraints that are inappropriate for some applications.
3. In [14] we only considered finite interpretations, whereas in this paper, we consider both finite and infinite inter-
pretations, and therefore in this paper we are able to handle a wider range of knowledgebases.
4. In [14] we used quasi-classical logic to find the four-valued models of a knowledgebase, whereas in this paper
we use a first-order version of Belnap’s logic, and as a result we have a simpler logic for finding the models for a
knowledgebase.
5. In [14] the measure of inconsistency for a knowledgebase was summarised by a sequence of numbers
〈n1, n2, n3, . . .〉 (where n1 is the measure for a domain of cardinality 1, n2 is the measure for a domain of
cardinality 2, and so on), whereas in this paper, the measure of inconsistency for a knowledgebase is summarised
by a ratio of univariate polynomial functions (i.e. a rational function).
6. In [14] we did not consider limit behaviour of measures, whereas in this paper we provide a characterisation of
measures in terms of limit behaviour.
In the following sections, we formalise our approach a follows. In Section 3 we review the basic definitions for the
language and semantics of first-order logic that we require. In Section 4 we present a first-order version of the seman-
tics for Belnap’s four-valued logic, called tolerant logic, that we will use to find the models for a knowledgebase. In
Section 5 we consider some classes of interpretations that allow us to restrict the models considered for a knowledge-
base (e.g. for temporal knowledge, we may wish to restrict consideration to models with elements corresponding to
the real numbers). In Section 6 we consider measures for a finite set of finite models (which we call a bounded frame),
for a set of finite models that includes a model of every domain size (which we call an unbounded frame), and for a
set of models that includes an infinite model (which we call an infinite frame). In Section 7 we consider a framework
for measuring consistency which is a counterpart to our framework for measuring inconsistency. Finally, in Section 8
we show that the semantics for tolerant logic subsumes the semantics for Belnap’s logic.
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In this section, we provide some basic definitions and notation that are used for presenting a first-order logic (FOL).
The language for FOL contains logical symbols: connectives {¬,∨,∧,→}, quantifiers {∀,∃}, punctuation symbols
(parentheses, comma, and period), and an infinite set of variables. A specific languageL is determined by its predicate,
constant, and function symbols; these we consider the nonlogical symbols that must be provided in a language. We
assume that the number of predicate and function symbols is finite. We sometimes write P(n) to indicate that P is an
n-ary predicate symbol.
We adopt the following conventions for our notation.
• Uppercase letters like P and R for predicate symbols.
• Lowercase letters like f , g, and h, perhaps with subscript, for function symbols.
• Lowercase letters like a, b, c, and d , perhaps with subscript, for constant symbols.
• Lowercase letters like x and y, perhaps with subscript, for variable symbols.
• Lowercase letters like t and s, perhaps with subscript, for terms.
We assume the usual classical definitions for a language including definitions for a free variable, a bound variable,
and a ground formula. An atom is of the form P(t1, . . . , tn), where t1, . . . , tn are terms. As usual, a literal is either an
atom or the negation of an atom. The set of formulae is defined by the usual inductive definitions for classical logic.
We use the Greek letters α,β, γ for literals, φ for a clause (a disjunction of literals), ψ for a conjunction of clauses,
and θ for any formula. For a language L, the set of formulae that can be formed by the usual inductive definitions is
denoted Formulae(L). We will usually not specify L and assume that given a knowledgebase Δ, L is the language
that contains exactly the nonlogical (i.e. constant, function, and predicate) symbols that appear in Δ.
We now consider the classical semantics for FOL.
Definition 1. A classical structure for the language L is a pair (D, I), where D is a nonempty set called the domain
and I is a function called an interpretation that makes assignments to the symbols of L as follows:
1. For every constant symbol c, I (c) ∈ D.
2. For every function symbol f of arity n > 0, I (f ) :Dn → D is an n-ary function.
3. For every predicate symbol P of arity n > 0, I (P ) ⊆ Dn is an n-ary relation.
We handle variables in FOL formulae using the standard notion of an assignment.
Definition 2. Let (D, I) be a classical structure, and let V be the set of variable symbols in L. An assignment A for
(D, I) is a function A :V → D. Given an assignment A, an x-variant assignment A′ is the same as A except perhaps
in the assignment for the variable x.
Whilst the definitions for language and interpretations considered in this section are those of classical logic, we
will use them for a paraconsistent logic in the next section.
In order to consider properties of our framework, we also require the classical consequence relation, denoted .
We assume ⊥ is shorthand for any classically inconsistent formula. However, in order to simplify the presentation we
assume that ⊥ is not in the language L. For a knowledgebase Δ ⊆ Formulae(L), as a shorthand we write Δ  ⊥ to
indicate that Δ is inconsistent in classical logic; otherwise we write Δ  ⊥.
4. Tolerant logic
We now present the definitions for tolerant logic which is a first-order four-valued logic. The language for tolerant
logic is that of FOL. However, the semantics is different; that is why tolerant logic supports paraconsistent reasoning.
The notion of a bistructure in tolerant logic is based on the notion of a classical interpretation. The basic difference
is that for tolerant logic we use a pair of classical interpretations to give a tolerant interpretation.
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constant symbols c, I+(c) = I−(c), and for all function symbols f , I+(f ) = I−(f ).
The above definition ensures that in a bistructure (D, I+, I−) both the classical interpretations I+ and I− use
the same domain object for each constant symbol, and the same function in the domain for each function symbol.
Therefore the classical interpretations I+ and I− in a bistructure can only differ in their assignment to predicate
symbols. As a result, we can use I+ as the interpretation for positive literals and I− as the interpretation for negative
literals. This is formalised in the definition for decoupled satisfaction.
Definition 4. For a bistructure E = (D, I+, I−) and an assignment A, we define a satisfiability relation, |=d , called
decoupled satisfaction for literals in L as follows:
(E,A) |=d P (t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈
I ∗(t1), . . . , I ∗(tn)
〉 ∈ I+(P )
(E,A) |=d ¬P(t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈
I ∗(t1), . . . , I ∗(tn)
〉 ∈ I−(P )
where for 1 i  n,
• if ti is a variable, then I ∗(ti) = I+(A(ti)) = I−(A(ti))
• if ti is a constant, then I ∗(ti) = I+(ti) = I−(ti)
• if ti is of the form f (s1, . . . , sm), then I ∗(ti) = I+(f )(I ∗(s1), . . . , I ∗(sm)) = I−(f )(I ∗(s1), . . . , I ∗(sm))
Since we allow both an atom and its complement to be satisfiable, we have decoupled, at the level of the structure,
the link between an atom and its complement. In contrast, if a classical structure satisfies a literal, then it is forced to
not satisfy the complement of the literal. This decoupling gives the basis for a semantics for paraconsistent reasoning.
In the following definition for satisfiability for arbitrary formulae, we provide a partial coupling (i.e. a coupling
that is weaker than in classical logic) for a formula and its complement. In the propositional case, this definition of
satisfiability coincides with that of Belnap’s four-valued logic [5], which is a propositional logic that has a four-valued
lattice-theoretic interpretation of connectives (see Theorem 5).
Definition 5. Let E be a bistructure and let A be an assignment. The satisfiability relation, denoted |=, is defined by
induction on the length of a formula as follows where α is a literal, and θ , θ1, and θ2 are arbitrary formulae.
(E,A) |= α iff (E,A) |=d α
(E,A) |= θ1 ∨ θ2 iff (E,A) |= θ1 or (E,A) |= θ2
(E,A) |= θ1 ∧ θ2 iff (E,A) |= θ1 and (E,A) |= θ2
(E,A) |= θ1 → θ2 iff (E,A) |= ¬θ1 or (E,A) |= θ2
(E,A) |= ¬¬θ iff (E,A) |= θ
(E,A) |= ¬(θ1 ∨ θ2) iff (E,A) |= ¬θ1 and (E,A) |= ¬θ2
(E,A) |= ¬(θ1 ∧ θ2) iff (E,A) |= ¬θ1 or (E,A) |= ¬θ2
(E,A) |= ¬(θ1 → θ2) iff (E,A) |= θ1 and (E,A) |= ¬θ2
(E,A) |= ∃x.θ iff for some x-variant assignment A′, (E,A′) |= θ
(E,A) |= ∀x.θ iff for all x-variant assignments A′, (E,A′) |= θ
(E,A) |= ¬∃x.θ iff (E,A) |= ∀x.¬θ
(E,A) |= ¬∀x.θ iff (E,A) |= ∃x.¬θ
In Definition 5, the first condition defines satisfaction for literals, the second to fourth conditions define satisfaction
for conjunction, disjunction, and implication, respectively, the fifth to eighth conditions define satisfaction for nega-
tion, and the ninth to twelfth conditions define satisfaction for quantification. We extend satisfaction to a bistructure
in the next definition.
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E |= θ iff for all assignments A, (E,A) |= θ
Example 1. Let L contain the predicate symbols P(2) and Q(1), the function symbol f (1), and the constant symbols
c1, c2, and c3. Let E = (D, I+, I−) be such that D = {d1, d2, d3} and the interpretations I+ and I− are as follows.
I+(c1) = I+(c2) = d1, I+(c3) = d3
I+(f )(d1) = d2, I+(f )(d2) = d3, I+(f )(d3) = d3
I+(P ) = {〈d1, d3〉, 〈d3, d3〉}, I−(P ) = {〈d1, d3〉}
I+(Q) = {〈d2〉}, I−(Q) = {}
Here, we see that 〈d1, d3〉 is in both I+(P ) and I−(P ). Since, I+(c1) = d1 and I+(c3) = d3, we have by Definition 3
that I−(c1) = d1 and I−(c3) = d3. Hence, for all assignments A, we get E |= P(c1, c3) and E |= ¬P(c1, c3). In
contrast, we see that 〈d3, d3〉 is in I+(P ) but not in I−(P ). Hence, for all assignments A, we get E |= P(c3, c3) but
not E |= ¬P(c3, c3). Similarly, 〈d2〉 is in I+(Q) but not in I−(Q), and I+(f )(d1) = d2, and I+(c1) = d1. Hence, for
all assignments A, we get E |= Q(f (c1)) but not E |= ¬Q(f (c1)).
Next we define the concept of a model.
Definition 7. Let Δ be a set of formulae and let E be a bistructure. E is a model of Δ iff for all θ ∈ Δ,E |= θ .
In the next section, we will consider classes of models for tolerant logic and then we will return to studying Tolerant
Logic, in Section 8, where we will show how tolerant logic generalises Belnap’s logic.
5. Classes of models for knowledgebases
We start with the class of all models for a knowledgebase (Definition 8) and then consider subclasses (Definitions 9–
13) that will allow us to focus our analysis of inconsistency in knowledgebases using appropriate assumptions without
having to add extra formulae to a knowledgebase or add further constraints on the semantics.
Definition 8. For a set of formulae Δ, Models(Δ) = {E | E |= θ for all θ ∈ Δ}.
Next we consider a definition that gives the models that satisfy the unique names assumption (UNA), meaning that
different constant symbols are assigned to different objects in the domain. In other words, each constant is treated as
a unique name.
Definition 9. Let Δ be a set of formulae.
UNAModels(Δ) = {(D,I+, I−) ∈ Models(Δ) | for all c, c′ if c = c′ then I+(c) = I+(c′)}
Example 2. Let E = (D, I+, I−) be such that D = {d1, d2, d3} and the interpretations I+ and I− are as follows.
I+(c1) = d1, I−(c2) = d2, I+(c3) = d3
I+(P ) = {〈d1, d3〉, 〈d3, d3〉}, I−(P ) = {〈d2, d3〉}
If Δ = {P(c1, c3),¬P(c2, c3),P (c3, c3)}, then E ∈ UNAModels(Δ).
As an illustration of the utility of measures of inconsistency, we will consider in the next section some examples of
knowledgebases that define sets and subsets of concepts (i.e. a form of ontological knowledge). For this, we will use
the following class of models.
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ConceptModels(Δ) = {E ∈ Models(Δ) |
for each formula of the form ∀x.α → β ∈ Δ,
for each assignment A,
if (E,A) |= α then (E,A) |= β}
Example 3. Let E = (D, I+, I−) be such that D = {d1, d2, d3} and the interpretations I+ and I− are as follows.
I+(c1) = d1, I+(c2) = d2, I+(c3) = d3
I+(P ) = {〈d1〉, 〈d2〉}, I−(P ) = {〈d3〉}
I+(Q) = {〈d1〉, 〈d2〉, 〈d3〉}, I−(Q) = {}
If Δ = {P(c1),∀x.P (x) → Q(x)}, then E ∈ ConceptModels(Δ). Now consider E′ which is the same as E except that
I+(P ) = {〈d1〉} = I−(P ) and I+(Q) = {〈d2〉, 〈d3〉}. So E′ ∈ Models(Δ) \ ConceptModels(Δ).
We will also consider the measurement of inconsistency in temporal knowledge. To facilitate this, we consider
models that conform to particular flows of time. Often temporal knowledge is represented using linear time lines,
isomorphic to some or all of the natural numbers or the real numbers, or more complex structures such as branching
time lines. These structures raise particular difficulties for analysis in the case of inconsistency.
For modelling time flows, we need a predicate t1  t2 where t1 is before t2 in the flow of time. The language L
may also contain additional predicate symbols as needed for the application. We also assume the following languages
for use with time flows: Lk is the language that includes the  relation and the constant symbols for the sequence
of natural numbers from 1 to k; Lp is the language that includes the  relation and the constant symbols for the
natural numbers (positive integers); and Li is the language that includes the  relation and the constant symbols for
the integers.
Definition 11. Let Δ ⊆ Formulae(Lk) be a set of formulae.
FPModels(Δ) = {(D,I+, I−) ∈ Models(Δ) | D is the sequence of natural numbers from 1 to k
and ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , k}(I+(n) = n)
and ∀c(I+(c) ∈ {1, . . . , k})
and there is a predicate symbol 
s.t. I+() is the usual ordering over {1, . . . , k}
and I−() = ({1, . . . , k} × {1, . . . , k}) \ I+()}
Definition 12. Let Δ ⊆ Formulae(Lp) be a set of formulae.
CPModels(Δ) = {(D,I+, I−) ∈ Models(Δ) | D = N
and ∀n ∈ N(I+(n) = n)
and ∀c(I+(c) ∈ N)
and there is a predicate symbol 
s.t. I+() is the usual ordering over N
and I−() = N2 \ I+()}
Definition 13. Let Δ ⊆ Formulae(Li ) be a set of formulae.
CIModels(Δ) = {(D,I+, I−) ∈ Models(Δ) | D = Z
and ∀n ∈ Z(I+(n) = n)
and ∀c(I+(c) ∈ Z)
and there is a predicate symbol 
s.t. I+() is the usual ordering over Z
and I−() = Z2 \ I+()}
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natural numbers (and so FP stands for finite positive integer models), CPModels(Δ) as the models of Δ that are
linear time models isomorphic to the natural numbers (and so CP stands for countable positive integer models), and
CIModels(Δ) as the models of Δ that are linear time models isomorphic to the integers (and so CI stands for countable
integer models).
In the following examples, we use the usual symbols for numbers for illustrating the elements of the domain and
for use as constant symbols in the language. It may be desirable in some situations, to use a different symbol for a
number in the domain and a number in the language, so that the difference between them is explicit.
Example 4. Let E = (D, I+, I−) be such that D = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7} and the interpretations I+ and I− are as follows.
I+(1) = 1, I+(2) = 2, I+(3) = 3, I+(4) = 4, I+(5) = 5, I+(6) = 6, I+(7) = 7
I+(P ) = {〈1〉, 〈3〉, 〈5〉, 〈7〉}
I−(P ) = {〈2〉, 〈4〉, 〈6〉}
I+() is the usual ordering over {1, . . . ,7}
I−() = ({1, . . . ,7} × {1, . . . ,7}) \ I+()
If Δ = {P(1),¬P(2),P (3)}, then E ∈ FPModels(Δ).
Example 5. Let E = (D, I+, I−) be such that D = N and the interpretations I+ and I− are as follows.
I+(n) = n, for all n ∈ N
I+(P ) = {〈n〉 | n ∈ N}
I−(P ) = {〈n〉 | n ∈ N}
I+() is the usual ordering over N
I−() = N2 \ I+()
If Δ = {∀x.P (x),∀x.¬P(x)}, then E ∈ CPModels(Δ).
We can define further classes of models as required to capture for example continuous flows of time isomorphic
to the real numbers and branching flows of time. We may also consider further constraints such as domain closure
axioms (e.g. [35]). Whilst we have not considered equality in this paper, it is possible to either adapt the definition
for tolerant logic to support an equality relation in the semantics (in which case, it may be appropriate to assume that
for any knowledgebase, the equality relation is never both true and false), or a form of quasi-equality is introduced by
axiomatisation (as proposed in [14]).
For every set of formulae Δ, Models(Δ) is nonempty. Furthermore, for every n ∈ N, and for every Δ, there is a
model E ∈ Models(Δ) such that E = (D, I+, I−) and |D| = n. Even if the formulae in Δ involve many constant
symbols, there may be an interpretation that assigns the same element in the domain to some or all of these constant
symbols. It is only when we deal with special classes of models such as UNAModels(Δ) that we eliminate these
possibilities.
6. Framework for measuring inconsistency
For a bistructure E = (D, I+, I−), let Domain(E) = D. In general, we can consider two disjoint possibilities
for |Domain(E)| for any bistructure E: These are that |Domain(E)| is finite or that |Domain(E)| is infinite. In the
following, we will provide a framework that measures inconsistency for both these cases.
For the rest of the paper, a set of bistructures is called a frame. We adopt the following nomenclature for describing
a frame Φ .
• Φ is a bounded frame iff ∃n ∈ N such that ∀E ∈ Φ |Domain(E)| n.
• Φ is an unbounded frame iff ∃m ∈ N ∀n ∈ N (nm implies ∃E ∈ Φ |Domain(E)| = n).
• Φ is an infinite frame iff ∃E ∈ Φ such that |Domain(E)| ℵ0.
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example of an unbounded frame is given by Models(Δ) when Δ = {∀x, y.P (x, y)}. An example of an infinite frame
is given by a singleton set containing just the bistructure given in Example 5.
Obviously, if Φ is a bounded frame, then Φ is not an unbounded frame, and Φ is not an infinite frame. But it is
possible that Φ is both an unbounded frame and an infinite frame.
For a frame Φ , any Φ ′ ⊆ Φ is called a subframe. Obviously, if Φ is unbounded, there are subframes of Φ that are
bounded. If Φ is an infinite frame, there may be a subframe that is unbounded, and there may be a subframe that is
bounded. To support consideration of subframes, we draw on the following two subsidiary definitions.
Finite(Φ) = {E ∈ Φ | ∣∣Domain(E)∣∣ ∈ N}
Infinite(Φ) = {E ∈ Φ | ∣∣Domain(E)∣∣ ℵ0}
Some of the key definitions in the rest of this paper will be based on analysing the bistructures in a frame. We in-
troduce the notions of bounded, unbounded, and infinite frames to provide a general way of presenting our framework
for measuring inconsistency. We will give definitions for a measure for inconsistency in a bistructure (Definition 16),
a measure for inconsistency in a bounded frame (Definition 17), a measure for inconsistency in an unbounded frame
(Definition 20), and a measure for inconsistency in an infinite frame (Definition 25). Normally, we expect each frame to
be a set of models for a knowledgebase Δ, such as Models(Δ), UNAModels(Δ), ConceptModels(Δ), or CPModels(Δ).
But since there are many possible classes of models that we could consider (Section 5 only considers some of the pos-
sible classes), it is simpler and more general to define our framework of measures in terms of frames rather than
directly in terms of particular classes of models for knowledgebases.
6.1. Measuring inconsistency in a bistructure
We start by considering how to measure the inconsistency of a bistructure. We assume that we are given a language
L and E = (D, I+, I−) is a bistructure for L. The nonlogical symbols considered in the definitions and examples are
assumed to be in L.
Definition 14. Let E = (D, I+, I−) be a bistructure, and let Π be a set of predicate symbols.
CollisionCount(Π,E)=
∑
Pi∈Π
∣∣Collision(Pi,E)∣∣
where Collision(Pi,E)= {〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ Dn | 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ I+(Pi)∩ I−(Pi)}.
The following definition gives an upper bound on CollisionCount given a set of predicate symbols and a bistructure.
Definition 15. Let E = (D, I+, I−) be a bistructure, and let Π be a set of predicate symbols.
UniverseCount(Π,E)=
∑
Pi∈Π
∣∣Universe(Pi,E)∣∣
where Universe(Pi,E)= {Pi(d1, . . . , dn) | d1, . . . , dn ∈ D and Pi is arity n}.
Example 6. Let E = (D, I+, I−) such that D = {1,2,3} and
I+(P ) = {〈1〉, 〈2〉} I+(Q) = {〈1,2〉, 〈1,3〉, 〈2,3〉}
I−(P ) = {〈3〉} I−(Q) = {〈1,2〉, 〈1,3〉, 〈3,2〉}
Hence, CollisionCount({P,Q},E) = 2 since,
Collision(P,E) = {}
Collision(Q,E) = {〈1,2〉, 〈1,3〉}
and UniverseCount({P,Q},E) = 12 since,
Universe(P,E)= {〈1〉, 〈2〉, 〈3〉}
Universe(Q,E)= {〈1,1〉, 〈1,2〉, 〈1,3〉, 〈2,1〉, 〈2,2〉, 〈2,3〉, 〈3,1〉, 〈3,2〉, 〈3,3〉}
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we assume that Π is always nonempty. Having Π as a parameter allows us to focus on particular subsets of predicate
symbols during an analysis of a model or set of models. This is valuable, since when considering arbitrarily large
domains, the value obtained by CollisionCount for some predicate symbols may “drown out” the CollisionCount for
other predicate symbols.
We bring together the measure of CollisionCount and UniverseCount in the following definition for the measure of
inconsistency for a set of predicate symbols in a bistructure with a finite domain.
Definition 16. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols and let E be a bistructure. The bistructure degree of inconsistency
of (Π,E), denoted Inc(Π,E), is defined as follows: If 0 < UniverseCount(Π,E) < ∞, then
Inc(Π,E)= CollisionCount(Π,E)
UniverseCount(Π,E)
otherwise Inc(Π,E)= 0.
Example 7. Continuing Example 6, Inc(Π,E)= 2/12 = 1/6, where Π = {P,Q}.
The following are some simple observations concerning the Inc function.
• For any Π and E, 0 Inc(Π,E) 1.
• For any Π and E, if Inc(Π,E)= 1, then for all Π ′ ⊆ Π , Inc(Π ′,E)= 1.
• For any Π and E, if Inc(Π,E)= 0, then for all Π ′ ⊆ Π , Inc(Π ′,E)= 0.
In tolerant logic for any knowledgebase there is always a model. This model can be obtained by taking each atom
in the language of the knowledgebase, and letting the model satisfy the atom and the negation of the atom. This model
gives the maximum degree of inconsistency, as formalised in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. For all Δ, there is an E ∈ Models(Δ), such that Inc(Π,E) = 1 where Π is the set of all predicate
symbols in Δ.
Proof. Consider the bistructure E that for each n-ary Pi ∈ Π , and d1, . . . , dn ∈ D, both E |= Pi(d1, . . . , dn)
and E |= ¬Pi(d1, . . . , dn) hold. So E ∈ Models(Δ) and Inc(Π,E) = 1 because CollisionCount(Π,E) =
UniverseCount(Π,E). 
6.2. Bounded degree of inconsistency
Now we consider the measure of inconsistency for a bounded frame. It is particularly useful if there is a maximum
finite size for the intended models. Essentially, it takes a credulous point of view by using the bistructure, from the
frame, with the minimum degree of inconsistency.
Definition 17. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols, and Φ be a bounded frame. The bounded degree of inconsistency
of (Π,Φ), denoted MicroInc(Π,Φ), is defined as follows.
MicroInc(Π,Φ)= Min({Inc(Π,E) | E ∈ Φ})
We can use this measure for giving a measure of inconsistency for a knowledgebase Δ when there is a case for a
bounded frame Φ that is in some sense representative of the knowledge. For example, if Δ is a set of ground literals,
then a bounded frame containing just one model that satisfies exactly the literals in Δ is in a sense representative of
the knowledge in Δ. The second reason we introduce the bounded degree of inconsistency is that we use it as part of
the definition of the unbounded degree of inconsistency that we introduce in the next section.
1076 J. Grant, A. Hunter / Artificial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1064–1093Example 8. Let Π = {P }, D = {d1, d2, d3, d4}, and Φ = {M1,M2} where M1 = (D, I+1 , I−1 ), and M2 = (D, I+2 , I−2 ).
I+1 (P ) =
{〈d1〉, 〈d2〉, 〈d3〉, 〈d4〉} I−1 (P ) = {〈d4〉}
I+2 (P ) =
{〈d1〉, 〈d2〉, 〈d3〉, 〈d4〉} I−2 (P ) = {〈d1〉, 〈d2〉, 〈d3〉, 〈d4〉}
Therefore,
CollisionCount
({P },M1)= 1
CollisionCount
({P },M2)= 4
UniverseCount
({P },M1)= 4
UniverseCount
({P },M2)= 4
So Inc({P },M1) = 1/4, and Inc({P },M2) = 4/4, and therefore MicroInc({P },Φ) = 1/4.
Example 9. Let Π = {P,Q}, D = {d1, d2}, and Φ = {M1,M2,M3} where M1 = (D, I+1 , I−1 ), M2 = (D, I+2 , I−2 ),
and M3 = (D, I+3 , I−3 ).
I+1 (P ) =
{〈d1〉, 〈d2〉} I−1 (P ) = {〈d1〉, 〈d2〉}
I+1 (Q) =
{〈d1〉} I−1 (Q) = {〈d1〉}
I+2 (P ) =
{〈d1〉} I−2 (P ) = {〈d1〉, 〈d2〉}
I+2 (Q) =
{〈d2〉} I−2 (Q) = {〈d2〉}
I+3 (P ) =
{〈d1〉, 〈d2〉} I−3 (P ) = {〈d1〉}
I+3 (Q) =
{〈d1〉, 〈d2〉} I−3 (Q) = {〈d1〉, 〈d2〉}
Since, for Mi ∈ {M1,M2,M3}, UniverseCount({P },Mi) = 2, UniverseCount({Q},Mi) = 2, and UniverseCount({P,
Q},M1) = 4 , we have
Inc
({P },M1)= 22 Inc
({P },M2)= 12 Inc
({P },M3)= 12
Inc
({Q},M1)= 12 Inc
({Q},M2)= 12 Inc
({Q},M3)= 22
Inc
({P,Q},M1)= 34 Inc
({P,Q},M2)= 24 Inc
({P,Q},M3)= 34
So MicroInc({P },Φ) = 1/2, MicroInc({Q},Φ) = 1/2, and MicroInc({P,Q},Φ) = 1/2.
We get MicroInc(Π,Φ)= 0 when Φ is a finite set of finite models for a knowledgebase that is consistent according
to classical logic, and we get MicroInc(Π,Φ)= 1 when Φ is a finite set of finite models for a “completely inconsistent”
knowledgebase (i.e. a knowledgebase for which each model of the knowledgebase, and for each atom in the language
of the knowledgebase, the model satisfies the atom and its negation).
Proposition 2. For all knowledgebases Δ, and for all sets of predicate symbols Π , if Δ  ⊥, and Φ = {E | E ∈
Models(Δ) and |Domain(E)| n for some n ∈ N}, then MicroInc(Π,Φ) = 0.
Proof. Φ is a nonempty bounded frame. Since Δ  ⊥ there is an E ∈ Φ such that Inc(Π,E) = 0. Hence,
MicroInc(Π,Φ) = 0. 
The definitions of Inc and MicroInc are quite general definitions characterising inconsistency for several reasons:
they actually support the use of diverse logics (not just tolerant logics) for generating the models of a knowledgebase,
the definitions are based on frames rather than knowledgebases, and they are able to focus attention on particular
predicates rather than all predicates used in the knowledgebase or language, thus providing a finer grained analysis of
inconsistency.
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Now we consider how to measure inconsistency in unbounded frames. An unbounded frame may contain infinite
bistructures; however, in the measure we define we consider only the finite bistructures in the frame. In particular, this
means that if the frame consists of the models of a knowledgebase, we restrict consideration to the finite models. In
the following definition we identify a function that for each n ∈ N gives the bounded degree of inconsistency for the
bistructures with domain of cardinality n.
Definition 18. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols, let Φ be an unbounded frame, and for each n ∈ N, let Φ[n] =
{E ∈ Φ | |Domain(E)| = n}. The discord function for (Π,Φ) is a function f ΦΠ :N → [0,1] such that for each n ∈ N,
if Φ[n] = ∅, then f ΦΠ (n) = MicroInc
(
Π,Φ[n]), otherwise f ΦΠ (n) = 0.
So we can consider an unbounded frame as a sequence of bounded frames Φ[n] (each of which contains just
bistructures of domain size n), then obtain the bounded degree of inconsistency of Φ[n] for each n, and then represent
this sequence of values by a univariate function which we call a discord function.
Example 10. Let Δ = {P(a),¬P(a)}, Π = {P }, and Φ = Models(Δ). So, for all n, f ΦΠ (n) = 1/n.
Example 11. Let Δ = {P(a),∃x.¬P(x)}, with Φ = Models(Δ), and Π = {P }. Hence, f ΦΠ (1) = 1, and for all n > 1,
f ΦΠ (n) = 0 because in the second case we can always choose an element of the domain other than a, say b, for which¬P(b) holds and there is no inconsistency.
The next two examples illustrate the effect of imposing a restriction on the models considered for a knowledgebase.
Example 12. Let Δ = {P(a),¬P(a),P (b),¬P(b),P (c),¬P(c)}, with Φ = Models(Δ), and Π = {P }. In this case,
the models in Φ with fewest conflicts are those where all constant symbols are assigned the same domain object.
Hence for all n, f ΦΠ (n) = 1/n.
Example 13. Let Δ = {P(a),¬P(a),P (b),¬P(b),P (c),¬P(c)}, with Φ = UNAModels(Δ), and Π = {P }. In this
case, because of the unique names assumption, the models in Φ assign each constant symbol a different domain object.
Hence there are no models of cardinality 1 or 2 and we obtain f ΦΠ (1) = 0, f ΦΠ (2) = 0, and for all n > 2, f ΦΠ (n) = 3/n.
Whilst in general, the discord function f ΦΠ is just a summary of the inconsistency arising in the bistructures in Φ ,
for some frames, the discord function is particularly interesting for our purposes. To consider some of these, we define
the concept of a special type of rational function that we call a special function.
Definition 19. A special function is a function r :N → [0,1] of the following form where r1 and r2 are each a
nonnegative and nondecreasing univariate polynomial function such that for all n ∈ N r2(n) = 0, there is k ∈ N such
that for all n k, 0 r1(n) r2(n), and
r(n) = r1(n)
r2(n)
For some classes of frames, we can show that the discord function is a special function. In Examples 10 and 12
each discord function is a rational function. We give some further examples for discord functions below and in Fig. 1.
Now we define the unbounded degree of inconsistency as a special function for an important class of unbounded
frames.
Definition 20. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols, Φ an unbounded frame, and let f ΦΠ be the corresponding discord
function. Suppose that there is a special function hΦΠ such that for all n > n0, f ΦΠ (n) = hΦΠ(n). We call hΦΠ the
unbounded degree of inconsistency for (Π,Φ). If an unbounded frame Φ for Π , written (Φ,Π), has an unbounded
degree of inconsistency, we call it a smooth frame. We also let Threshold(hΦΠ) be the lowest value for n0 where
n0 ∈ N ∪ {0}.
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Δ1 {P(a),¬P(a)∨ ¬Q(a),Q(a)} 0 0 12n
Δ2 {∀x.P (x),∀x.¬P(x)∨ ¬Q(x),∀x.Q(x)} 0 0 12
Δ3 {∀x.P (x)∧ ¬P(x),∀x.Q(x)} 1 0 12
Δ4 {∀x.P (x)∧ ¬P(x),∀x.Q(x)∧ ¬Q(x)} 1 1 1
Δ5 {P(a)∧ ¬P(a),∀x.Q(x)} 1n 0 12n
Δ6 {∀x, y.P (x, y)∧ ¬P(x, y),∀x.Q(x)} 1 0 nn+1
Δ7 {∃x, y.P (x, y)∧ ¬P(x, y),∀x, y.Q(x, y)} 1
n2
0 12n2
Δ8 {P(a)∧ ¬P(a),∀x.Q(x)∧ ¬Q(x)} 1n 1 n+12n
Fig. 1. Examples of discord functions fΦΠ such that Φ is Models(Δi) with different knowledgebases Δi and with different sets of predicate
symbols Πj . In each case, the discord function is a special function.
Examples 10–13 illustrate smooth frames. In particular, for Example 13, hΦΠ(n) = 3/n and Threshold(hΦΠ) = 2.
The following example of an unbounded frame is not smooth.
Example 14. Let Φ = {Ei | i ∈ N} and Π = {P(1)}, where Ei = (Di, I+i , I−i ) such that Di = {d1, . . . , di}, I+i (P ) =
{〈d1〉} and for the odd values of i, I−i (P ) = {〈d1〉} while for the even values of i, I−i (P ) = ∅. In this case for the odd
values of n, f ΦΠ (n) = 1/n and for the even values of n, f ΦΠ (n) = 0. Of course 1/n is a special function; however,
there is no finite threshold to allow us to identify it with f ΦΠ after the threshold value.
If Δ is consistent according to classical logic, and Φ = Models(Δ) then hΦΠ(n) = 0 = f ΦΠ (n), for all n > 1, because
for any such n ∈ N, either there is no model of size n or there is a model of size n with no collisions. We excluded the
case of n = 1 because of examples such as the consistent theory Δ = {∃x.P (x),∃x.¬P(x)} that has a collision in a
model of size 1. In contrast, we can characterise a “maximally inconsistent” model as follows.
Proposition 3. If for all n ∈ N, f ΦΠ (n) = 1 = hΦΠ(n), then for each arity m predicate symbol P ∈ Π , and for all
E ∈ Φ ,
E |= ∀x1, . . . , xm.P (x1, . . . , xm)∧ ¬P(x1, . . . , xm)
Proof. Since f ΦΠ (n) is always 1, every atom must be involved in a collision. 
To illustrate how the unbounded degree of inconsistency can be useful, we give two examples of ontologies pre-
sented in classical logic. As discussed in Section 2, we can adopt the following conventions: (1) A concept P is
represented by a monadic predicate P(x); (2) An individual c that is a member of a concept P is represented by
a ground predicate P(c); (3) The relationship that the concept Q is a subconcept of the concept P is represented
by ∀x.Q(x) → P(x); and (4) The relationship that the concept Q is disjoint with the concept P is represented by
∀x.Q(x) → ¬P(x)∧ ∀x.P (x) → ¬Q(x).
Example 15. Let Δ be the following set of formulae where instance c is member of disjoint concepts.
∀x.S(x) → R(x) ∀x.(Q(x) → ¬S(x)∧ S(x) → ¬Q(x)) S(c)
∀x.Q(x) → P(x) ∀x.(P(x) → ¬R(x)∧R(x) → ¬P(x)) Q(c)
If Π = {P,Q,R,S} and Φ = ConceptModels(Δ), then for all E ∈ Φ ,
E |= P(c) E |= Q(c) E |= R(c) E |= S(c)
E |= ¬P(c) E |= ¬Q(c) E |= ¬R(c) E |= ¬S(c)
Hence, for all E ∈ Φ , if |E| = n then Min({CollisionCount(Π,E)}) = 4 and UniverseCount(Π,E) = 4n. Therefore
f ΦΠ (n) = 4/4n = 1/n for all n ∈ N, and so hΦΠ(n) = 1/n with Threshhold(hΦΠ) = 0. Note, we get the same result if
we replace S(c) and Q(c) by ∃x.(S(x)∧Q(x)) in Δ.
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that T and U are the same concept, and (3) states that T and U comprise everything.
(1) ∀x.(T (x) → ¬U(x)∧U(x) → ¬T (x))
(2) ∀x.(T (x) → U(x)∧U(x) → T (x))
(3) ∀x.T (x)∨U(x)
If Π = {T ,U}, E ∈ Φ = ConceptModels(Δ), and d ∈ Domain(E), then according to (3) either E |= T (d) or
E |= U(d) (or both). Assume w.l.g. that E |= T (d). Then by (1) E |= ¬U(d) and by (2) E |= U(d). Applying
(1) again yields E |= ¬T (d). Hence, for all E ∈ Φ , Inc(Π,E) = 2n/2n. Therefore, f ΦΠ (n) = hΦΠ(n) = 1, and
Threshold(hΦΠ) = 0.
Example 17. Continuing Example 16, we extend Δ by adding the following set of formulae.
∀x.S(x) → R(x) ∀x.(Q(x) → ¬S(x)∧ S(x) → ¬Q(x))
∀x.Q(x) → P(x) ∀x.(P(x) → ¬R(x)∧R(x) → ¬P(x))
Let Π = {P,Q,R,S,T ,U} and Φ = ConceptModels(Δ). Now for any E ∈ Φ and for any d ∈ Domain(E), it is
possible to just make E |= ¬P(d), E |= ¬Q(d), E |= ¬R(d), and E |= ¬S(d) with no collisions for the predicates
P , Q, R, and S. Therefore, f ΦΠ (n) = hΦΠ(n) = 2n/6n= 1/3, and Threshold(hΦΠ) = 0.
As we showed in Example 14 not all unbounded frames are smooth. However, the following result shows that if we
consider all the models of a knowledgebase Δ (i.e. Models(Δ) ), or if we consider UNAModels(Δ), or if we consider
ConceptModels(Δ), then there is an unbounded degree of inconsistency for any Π , and hence such a class of models
is a smooth frame.
Theorem 1. Let Δ be a knowledgebase, and let Π be a set of predicate symbols. If Φ = Models(Δ), or if Φ =
UNAModels(Δ), or if Φ = ConceptModels(Δ), then (Π,Φ) is a smooth frame.
Proof. We start with the case where Φ = Models(Δ) and Π is the set of all predicate symbols in Δ. It is known that
for all n ∈ N, Φ[n] = ∅ (where Φ[n] contains the models of size n in Φ). What is needed is to show that the discord
function f ΦΠ is a special function after a possible threshold value, as explained in Definitions 19 and 20. Since for all
E ∈ Φ[n], UniverseCount(Π,E) is the same, let r2(n) = UniverseCount(Π,E) for some E ∈ Φ[n]. Clearly, r2 can
never be 0 because the domains and Π are not empty. Also, let r1(n) = Min({CollisionCount(Π,E)|E ∈ Φ[n]}). We
have previously observed that 0 Inc(Π,E) 1 for all Π and E, hence 0 r1(n) r2(n) holds for all n ∈ N. So we
must show that both r1 and r2 are nondecreasing univariate polynomial functions. By definition both are univariate
functions. It remains to show that both r1 and r2 are nondecreasing polynomial functions.
We start with r2. We can actually compute UniverseCount(Π,E) for E ∈ Φ[n] as follows. Suppose Π contains
the predicate symbols P1(m1), . . . ,Pk(mk) (the arities are in parentheses). Then r2(n) = UniverseCount(Π,E) =
nm1 + · · · + nmk . This is a polynomial, although it may have to be simplified to write in standard form. Clearly, r2 is
nondecreasing.
Computing r1 can be quite complex for an arbitrary Δ. What we need to show is that r1 is nondecreasing and
polynomial. It is clear that r1 is nondecreasing after a threshold of n = 1 because as we enlarge a model by adding a
domain element, the number of collisions cannot decrease. There may be a problem in the special case of going from
1 to 2 elements, for example, if Δ = {∃x.P (x),∃x.¬P(x)}. So it remains to show that r1 is a polynomial function.
We do not give all the details here but explain the basic idea through an example. At the end of this subsection we
actually calculate r1 for some special cases.
Consider the case where Π = {P(2)} and there are no constant or function symbols in the language. Recall that to
compute r1(n) we try to find the minimal number of collisions in a model of size n. We choose 4 statements in Δ that
cause collisions, taking care of all quantifier combinations (for arity 2):
(1) ∃x, y.P (x, y)∧ ¬P(x, y)
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(3) ∀x,∃y.P (x, y)∧ ¬P(x, y)
(4) ∀x, y.P (x, y)∧ ¬P(x, y)
The minimal number of collisions for (1) is 1, for (2) and (3) is n, and for (4) is n2. What happens is that for each argu-
ment an existential quantifier provides a multiplicative factor 1 while a universal quantifier provides a multiplicative
factor n. This does not change even if there is a mix of different quantifiers, such as
(5) ∀x,∃y.P (x, y)∧ ∃x,∀y.¬P(x, y)
However, we may have to subtract overlaps and recognise when there are no collisions such as for
(6) ∃x, y.P (x, y)∧ ∃x, y.¬P(x, y)
(except for the case n = 1 that we have eliminated). The important point is that every number we get for collisions must
be ni for some i, where 0  i  Arity(P ), including the number of elements in an overlap. Adding and subtracting
such powers of n always yields a polynomial.
Now suppose that Π contains the predicate symbols P1(m1), . . . ,Pk(mk) as given above. Then for any Pj , 1 
j  k, the minimal number of collisions is calculated as above for P except that now we get powers of n up to the
largest arity of the predicate symbols. So far, implicitly we have restricted our analysis to conjunctions. In the case
of disjunction, such as θ = θ1 ∨ · · · ∨ θt we take the minimum number of collisions in any of the θi , 1 i  t , while
implication can be rewritten using disjunction (and negation). In all cases the calculation yields a sum of powers of n
with subtractions, also powers of n for overlaps, and hence the result is a polynomial. A similar argument works if Π
is a subset of the predicates in Δ.
Let us now consider the case where the language contains constant and function symbols. For the purpose of
counting collisions we can always interpret a function symbol as a constant function in which case it has the effect
of a constant symbol in counting collisions (as discussed in Section 2). So we need not deal separately with function
symbols. But a constant symbol has the same effect as an existential quantifier, so for example,
(7) ∃y.P (c, y)∧ ¬P(c, y)
gives the same number of minimal collisions as (1). This completes the proof for the case where Φ = Models(Δ).
We now show how this result extends to the other classes of types of models. Consider the case where  =
ConceptModels(Δ). If for all n ∈ N, [n] contains a model in Φ[n] with a minimal number of collisions, then
everything works as before. So let us consider how models of Φ[n] with a minimal number of collisions might not be
in [n]. The following formula illustrates what might happen:
(8) ∀x.P (x)∧ ¬P(x)∧ ¬Q(x)∧ (P (x) → Q(x))
Consider a model E of Φ with minimal number of collisions, where for all d ∈ Domain(E), 〈d〉 ∈ I+(P )∩ I−(P )∩
I−(Q) but d /∈ I+(Q). There are n collisions. However E /∈  . For E to satisfy the requirement for a concept model,
d must also be in I+(Q). This requires adding n collisions. In the general case the number of collisions that must be
added will again be a power of n, so r1 is still a polynomial.
Finally, we consider the case where Γ = UNAModels(Δ). Let nΔ be the number of different constant symbols in
Δ or 1 if there are none. Here the proof for Φ[n] goes through for Γ [n], n nΔ. Hence the same result holds but with
Threshold(hΓΠ) = nΔ − 1. 
Using the proof of this theorem we can show that when the knowledgebase is exclusively ground formulae (i.e.
there are no variables), then the numerator of the discord function is a constant.
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symbols. If Φ = Models(Δ), or Φ = ConceptModels(Δ), or Φ = UNAModels(Δ), then there is an m ∈ N, and n0 ∈ N,
such that for all n ∈ N, where n > n0, the numerator of hΦΠ(n) is m.
Proof. Clearly, Δ must have at least one constant symbol. Now recall from the proof of Theorem 1 that each constant
symbol acts as an existential quantifier from the point of view of counting collisions. Also, each existential quan-
tifier yields a multiplicative factor of 1. Hence there are no terms in the polynomial for r1 (the numerator) with ni
for i > 0, so it must be a constant. We can actually get an upper bound on m as follows. If there are t predicate
symbols then m t for Φ = Models(Δ) and Φ = ConceptModels(Δ), because we can identify all the constant sym-
bols with a single element in the domain of the model and each predicate symbol causes at most one collision. Here
n0 = 0. The calculation is more complicated in the case where Φ = UNAModels(Δ) because all constant symbols
must be interpreted as different elements of D. Suppose Δ contains c constant symbols and the predicate symbols are:
P1(k1), . . . ,Pq(kq). Then the number of collisions for any E ∈ Φ of size  c (there are no models of size < c) must
be at most ck1 + · · · + ckq whose sum is the upper bound for m with n0 = c − 1. 
We can compare discord functions using the following ordering relation.
Definition 21. The discord ordering, denoted , is defined as follows, where f ΦΠ and f Φ
′
Π ′ are discord functions.
f ΦΠ  f Φ
′
Π ′ iff there is an n
′ ∈ N such that for all n ∈ N, if n′  n, then f ΦΠ (n) f Φ
′
Π ′ (n)
Intuitively, if f ΦΠ  f Φ
′
Π ′ , then (Φ,Π) is less or equally inconsistent with (Φ
′,Π ′).
Next we show by examples that the discord function is not monotonic or antimonotonic in general.
Example 18. Let Δ2 = {P(c)}, Π = {P }, and Δ1 = {P(c),¬P(c)} and Φi = Models(Δi) for i = 1,2. Clearly Φ1 ⊂
Φ2 and for all n ∈ N, f Φ2Π (n) < fΦ1Π (n), so we cannot have f Φ1Π  f Φ2Π . Now let Φ4 = Models(Δ1) for the Δ1 given
above and Φ3 = {E | E ∈ Φ4 and |Domain(E)| is even}. Here, Φ3 ⊂ Φ4, but now f Φ4Π (n) = 1/n for all n ∈ N, while
f
Φ3
Π (n) = 1/n for all even n and 0 for all odd n. Hence it is not the case that f Φ4Π  f Φ3Π .
This shows that in general, Φ1 ⊆ Φ2 implies neither f Φ1Π  f Φ2Π nor f Φ2Π  f Φ1Π . Note that Φ3 is not a smooth
frame.
Example 19. Let Δ2, Δ3, Π1, and Π3 be the examples in Fig. 1. Here, Π1 ⊂ Π3. Let Φ2 = Models(Δ2) and Φ3 =
Models(Δ3). We obtain for all n ∈ N f Φ2Π1 (n) < f
Φ2
Π3
(n) and f Φ3Π3 (n) < f
Φ3
Π1
(n). This shows that in general, Π1 ⊆ Π2
implies neither f ΦΠ1  f ΦΠ2 nor f ΦΠ2  f ΦΠ1 .
We noted in Example 18 that Φ3 is not a smooth frame. In fact, for smooth frames, the discord function is anti-
monotonic in Φ .
Proposition 5. If Φ1 and Φ2 are both smooth frames and Φ1 ⊆ Φ2, then f Φ2Π  f Φ1Π .
Proof. Let Φ1 ⊆ Φ2 for smooth frames Φ1 and Φ2 where the corresponding special functions are hΦ1Π and hΦ2Π
with Threshold(hΦ1Π ) = n1 and Threshold(hΦ2Π ) = n2. Let n0 = max{n1, n2}. Recalling that additional models cannot
increase the minimum number of collisions for a Φ[n], we obtain for all n > n0, hΦ2Π (n) = f Φ2Π (n)  hΦ1Π (n) =
f
Φ1
Π (n), hence f
Φ2
Π  f Φ1Π . 
For a knowledgebase Δ, let Con(Δ) = {Γ ⊆ Δ | Γ  ⊥} be the set of consistent subsets of Δ. The set of maximally
consistent subsets of Δ is defined as follows.
MaxCon(Δ) = {Γ ∈ Con(Δ) | for all Γ ′ ∈ Con(Δ)(Γ ⊂ Γ ′)}
Also let Free(Δ) =⋂MaxCon(Δ) be the set of formulae that are in all maximally consistent subsets of Δ. These may
be regarded as the uncontroversial formulae in Δ since they do not appear in any minimally inconsistent subset of Δ
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The following result shows that if a formula θ is not involved in any inconsistency in Δ∪ {θ}, then adding θ to Δ
cannot make the inconsistencies in Δ worse.
Proposition 6. Let Φ1 = Models(Δ), and Φ2 = Models(Δ∪{α}). If α ∈ Free(Δ∪{α}), then f Φ2Π  f Φ1Π . Furthermore,
if α contains only nonlogical symbols in Δ then f Φ2Π = f Φ1Π .
Proof. Let Threshold(hΦ1Π ) = n10, and let Threshold(hΦ2Π ) = n20. Since Δ ⊆ Δ ∪ {α}, n20  n10. So for each n > n20,
Min({CollisionCount(Π,E) | E ∈ Φ1[n]} = Min({CollisionCount(Π,E) | E ∈ Φ2[n]}. Also for each n > n20, for each
E1 ∈ Φ1[n], and for each E2 ∈ Φ2[n], UniverseCount(Π,E1) UniverseCount(Π,E2). So for each n ∈ N, if n > n20,
then MicroInc(Π,Φ2[n])  MicroInc(Π,Φ1[n]). Hence, f Φ2Π  f Φ1Π . In case α contains only nonlogical symbols in
Δ, then we have UniverseCount(Π,E1) = UniverseCount(Π,E2), and so f Φ2Π = f Φ1Π . 
In the proof of Theorem 1 we gave a general argument to explain why the discord function is a special function for
a smooth frame. Now we give specific results for some special cases.
Proposition 7. Let ψ be a sentence of the form Q1x1, . . . ,Qkxk.P (t1, . . . , tm)∧¬P(t1, . . . , tm) where {x1, . . . , xk} ⊆
{t1, . . . , tm}, and {x1, . . . , xk} = ∅, and each ti ∈ {t1, . . . , tm} \ {x1, . . . , xk} is a constant symbol, and Q1, . . . ,Qk ∈
{∀,∃}. If Φ = Models({ψ}), and Π = {P }, then
f ΦΠ (n) =
d1 × · · · × dk
nm
where for each di ∈ {d1, . . . , dk}, di = n if Qi is a universal quantifier, and di = 1 if Qi is an existential quantifier.
Proof. If ψ is of the form Q1x1, . . . ,Qkxk.P (t1, . . . , tm) ∧ ¬P(t1, . . . , tm), then for each n, there is an E ∈ Φ[n],
with a minimal number of collisions, such that CollisionCount(Π,E)= d1 ×· · ·×dk , where for each di ∈ {d1, . . . , dk},
di = n if Qi is a universal quantifier, because all n domain elements are involved in collisions, and di = 1 if Qi is
an existential quantifier, because one domain element must be involved in a collision. Furthermore, for all E ∈ Φ[n],
UniverseCount(Π,E)= nm, therefore f ΦΠ (n) = (d1 × · · · × dk)/nm. 
For example, consider ψ = ∀x, y,∃z.P (x, y, z) ∧ ¬P(x, y, z). So for Φ = Models({ψ}), and Π = {P }, we get
f ΦΠ = n2/n3 = 1/n. Also consider ψ ′ = ∀y,∃z.P (a, y, z) ∧ ¬P(a, y, z). So for Φ ′ = Models({ψ ′}), and Π = {P },
we get f Φ ′Π = n/n3 = 1/n2.
Corollary 1. Let ψ be a sentence of the form ∀x1, . . . , xk.P (x1, . . . , xk)∧ ¬P(x1, . . . , xk). If Φ = Models({ψ}), and
Π = {P }, then f ΦΠ (n) = 1.
Corollary 2. Let ψ be a sentence of the form ∃x1, . . . , xk(P (t1, . . . , tm)∧ ¬P(t1, . . . , tm)). If Φ = Models({ψ}), and
Π = {P }, then f ΦΠ (n) = 1/nm.
When ψ is a sentence of the form Q1x1, . . . ,Qkxk.P (t1, . . . , tm)∧¬P(t1, . . . , tm)∧P ′(t ′1, . . . , t ′m)∧¬P ′(t ′1, . . . ,
t ′m) where {x1, . . . , xk} ⊆ {t1, . . . , tm, t ′1, . . . , t ′m} and {x1, . . . , xk} = ∅, and each ti ∈ {t1, . . . , tm} is either a variable
symbol or a constant symbol, and P = P ′, we can obtain the special function for the models of each of the following
using Proposition 7 and then sum them.
Q1x1, . . . ,Qkxk.P (t1, . . . , tm)∧ ¬P(t1, . . . , tm)
Q1x1, . . . ,Qkxk.P ′(t ′1, . . . , t ′m)∧ ¬P ′(t ′1, . . . , t ′m)
For example, consider ψ = ∀x, y,∃z.P (a, y, z)∧¬P(a, y, z)∧P ′(x, y, z)∧¬P ′(x, y, z). So for Φ = Models({ψ}),
and Π = {P,P ′}, we get f ΦΠ = (n+ n2)/2n3.
Similarly when ψ is a sentence of the form Q1x1, . . . ,Qkxk.P (t1, . . . , tm) ∧ ¬P(t1, . . . , tm) ∧ P(t ′1, . . . , t ′m) ∧¬P(t ′ , . . . , t ′m) where {x1, . . . , xk} ⊆ {t1, . . . , tm, t ′ , . . . , t ′m} and {x1, . . . , xk} = ∅, and each ti ∈ {t1, . . . , tm} is either1 1
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using the above result, then obtain the special function by taking their sum minus their overlap.
Q1x1, . . . ,Qkxk.P (t1, . . . , tm)∧ ¬P(t1, . . . , tm)
Q1x1, . . . ,Qkxk.P (t
′
1, . . . , t
′
m)∧ ¬P(t ′1, . . . , t ′m)
For example, consider ψ = ∀x, y,∃z.P (a, y, z) ∧ ¬P(a, y, z) ∧ P(x, b, z) ∧ ¬P(x, b, z). So for Φ = Models({ψ}),
and Π = {P }, we get f ΦΠ = (2n− 1)/n3.
6.4. Inconsistency in the limit for smooth frames
We now consider the limit behaviour of the unbounded degree of inconsistency for smooth frames. In the limit,
limn→∞ f ΦΠ = limn→∞ hΦΠ , so it suffices to write only one of these functions. An advantage of considering the limit is
that we can identify a measure of inconsistency that is a rational number in the [0,1] interval. This provides a simple
summary of the unbounded degree of inconsistency for a knowledgebase.
Theorem 2. If f ΦΠ is a discord function, and Φ is a smooth frame, then there is a rational number k ∈ [0,1] such that
limn→∞ f ΦΠ (n) = k.
Proof. Let f ΦΠ be a discord function, and let Φ be a smooth frame. By definition, there is an n0 such that for all
n > n0, f ΦΠ is a special function. Therefore, there are polynomials b0 + b1n + b2n2 + · · · + bpnp and c0 + c1n +
c2n2 + · · · + cqnq , such that for all n > n0,
f ΦΠ (n) =
c0 + c1n+ c2n2 + · · · + cqnq
b0 + b1n+ b2n2 + · · · + bpnp
Since, q = p or q < p, we have the following two cases.
If q = p, then lim
n→∞
c0 + c1n+ c2n2 + · · · + cpnp
b0 + b1n+ b2n2 + · · · + bpnp =
cp
bp
where cp  bp
If q < p, then lim
n→∞
c0 + c1n+ c2n2 + · · · + cqnq
b0 + b1n+ b2n2 + · · · + bpnp = 0
Therefore, there exists a rational number k ∈ [0,1] such that limn→∞ f ΦΠ (n) = k. 
Example 20. Returning to Fig. 1, with Π = Π3, the limits are as follows: for Δ1, Δ5, and Δ7, limn→∞ f ΦΠ = 0, for
Δ2, Δ3, and Δ8, limn→∞ f ΦΠ = 1/2, and for Δ4, and Δ6, limn→∞ f ΦΠ = 1.
Following on from Theorem 2, when limn→∞ f ΦΠ (n) is nonzero, we have the following characterisation of conflicts
arising.
Proposition 8. Let f ΦΠ be a discord function and Φ a smooth frame such that for all n > n0,
f ΦΠ (n) =
c0 + c1n+ c2n2 + · · · + cpnp
b0 + b1n+ b2n2 + · · · + bpnp
Then for all E ∈ Φ , there is a P ∈ Π such that E |= ∀x1, . . . , xp.P (x1, . . . , xp)∧ ¬P(x1, . . . , xp).
Proof. Since f ΦΠ is a discord function for a smooth frame, for all n > n0, f ΦΠ = hΦΠ is a special function. Therefore,
for all n > n0, MicroInc(Π,Φ[n]) is a special function, and so, for all n > n0, Min({Inc(Π,E) | E ∈ Φ[n]}) is a special
function. This implies that for all n > n0, the following is a special function:
Min
({
CollisionCount(Π,E) ∣∣∣E ∈ Φ[n]
})UniverseCount(Π,E)
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Min({CollisionCount(Π,E) | E ∈ Φ[n]})
UniverseCount(Π,E)
Thus,
Min
({
CollisionCount(Π,E) | E ∈ Φ[n]})= c0 + c1n+ c2n2 + · · · + cpnp (1)
UniverseCount(Π,E)= b0 + b1n+ b2n2 + · · · + bpnp (2)
Using the proof of Theorem 1, (2) implies that there is an arity p predicate symbol P ∈ Π , and therefore from (1) and
the fact that cp = 0 and the highest power of n is p, it follows that for all E ∈ Φ , there is an arity p predicate symbol
P ∈ Π , such that E |= ∀x1, . . . , xp.P (x1, . . . , xp)∧ ¬P(x1, . . . , xp). 
The next result is basically the reverse of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. If k ∈ [0,1], and k is rational, then there is a smooth frame Φ with discord function f ΦΠ such that
limn→∞ f ΦΠ (n) = k.
Proof. Let k = s/t where 0 s  t . Let r1(n) = s × n and r2(n) = t × n. Clearly, r1 and r2 are both nondecreasing
and nonnegative univariate polynomial functions such that for all n ∈ N (r1(n)/r2(n)) = k. Now we construct a
knowledgebase Δ, such that Φ = Models(Δ), and Π is the set of all predicate symbols used in Δ, so that
r1(n) = Min
({
CollisionCount(Π,E) | E ∈ Φ[n]})
r2(n) = UniverseCount(Π,E), when E ∈ Φ[n]
Let Π have t monadic predicate symbols. So for any n, and any E ∈ Φ[n],
UniverseCount(Π,E)= n× t
Then we continue the construction by putting s formulae into Δ of the form ∀x.Pi(x) ∧ ¬Pi(x) using s different
predicate symbols available in Π . So, for any n,
Min
({
CollisionCount(Π,E) | E ∈ Φ[n]})= n× s
Hence, for any n, r1(n) = n × s. By definition, Min({Inc(Π,E) | E ∈ Φ[n]}) = MicroInc(Π,Φ[n]) = f ΦΠ (n). Since
for all n, (r1(n)/r2(n)) = s/t = k, limn→∞ f ΦΠ (n) = k. 
Example 21. For k = 2/5, if Δ = {∀x.P1(x)∧¬P1(x),∀x.P2(x)∧¬P2(x)}, and Π = {P1,P2,P3,P4,P5}, all unary
predicate symbols, then for each n, r1(n) = 2 × n and r2(n) = 5 × n. Hence, limn→∞ f ΦΠ (n) = 2/5.
Proposition 9. Let Δ be a knowledgebase that incorporates no variable symbols, and let Π be a set of predicate
symbols. If Φ = Models(Δ), then limn→∞ f ΦΠ (n) = 0.
Proof. If Δ is a knowledgebase which incorporates no variable symbols, and Φ = Models(Δ), then there is a m ∈ N,
such that for all n ∈ N, the numerator of hΦΠ(n) is m (according to Proposition 4). Since, the denominator of hΦΠ(n) is
a nondecreasing and nonnegative univariate polynomial function of n of degree at least 1, hΦΠ(n) converges to 0. 
So whilst (Π,Φ) may be inconsistent for any finite bistructure, in the limit it may be consistent (i.e. k may be 0).
Intuitively, this means that the “inconsistent part” of the knowledge becomes “infinitely insignificant” in the limit. We
use this result to give us the following nomenclature for a discord function f ΦΠ .
Definition 22. For any Φ and Π , and for any k ∈ [0,1],
(Π,Φ) is k-inconsistent in the limit iff lim
n→∞f
Φ
Π (n) = k.
So by Proposition 9, a knowledgebase without variable symbols is always 0-inconsistent in the limit.
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symbols of Π of the highest arity. If Φ = Models(Δ) then (Π,Φ) is k-inconsistent in the limit iff (Π ′,Φ) is k-
inconsistent in the limit.
Proof. By Definition 22, (Π,Φ) is k-inconsistent in the limit iff limn→∞ f ΦΠ (n) = k, where the discord function is
f ΦΠ . Similarly, there is a discord function f ΦΠ ′ for (Π
′,Φ) such that limn→∞ f ΦΠ ′(n) = k′. Let the highest arity of a
predicate symbol in Π be p. Hence, there are polynomials c0 + c1n+ c2n2 + · · ·+ cqnq and b0 + b1n+ b2n2 + · · ·+
bpn
p such that
f ΦΠ (n) =
c0 + c1n+ c2n2 + · · · + cqnq
b0 + b1n+ b2n2 + · · · + bpnp
and there is a polynomial e0 + e1n+ e2n2 + · · · + esns such that
f ΦΠ ′(n) =
e0 + e1n+ e2n2 + · · · + esns
b0 + b1n+ b2n2 + · · · + brnp
since the power of the leading term for UniverseCount does not change.
There are two cases.
(Case 1) k = 0. This means that q < p and hence Φ |= ∀x1, . . . , xp.P (x1, . . . , xp)∧ ¬P(x1, . . . , xp) for any arity
p predicate symbol P . This remains the case if some predicate symbols are removed from Π , hence k′ = 0.
(Case 2) k > 0. This means that q = p and hence there are cq predicate symbols P1, . . . ,Pcq , such that Φ |=
∀x1, . . . , xp.(Pi(x1, . . . , xp)∧¬Pi(x1, . . . , xp)) for all i, 1 i  cq . As long as all of these arity n predicate symbols
stay in Π ′, we obtain s = q = p and cq = es . So limn→∞ f ΦΠ ′(n) = limn→∞ f ΦΠ (n) = k, proving the result. 
Since we are primarily interested in measuring inconsistency in knowledgebases, the unbounded degree of in-
consistency, in the form of a special function, is an efficient way of describing and analysing inconsistency in
knowledgebases that have finite models. Furthermore, with the unbounded degree of inconsistency, we can categorise
the models for a knowledgebase as being either consistent in the limit (i.e. k = 0) or inconsistent in the limit (i.e.
k > 0). Though note that the discord function gives a finer distinction than the k in the limit: Consider for example
two discord functions f and f ′ with the same limit but for which f ΦΠ  f ′ΦΠ holds (such as 1/n2 and 1/n).
6.5. Infinite degree of inconsistency
Now we turn to measuring inconsistency in bistructures with infinite domains. We have already argued that infinite
domains arise in diverse applications in artificial intelligence and computer science, such as when reasoning about
temporal knowledge. Unfortunately, when we consider infinite domains, we are unable to consider inconsistency as a
ratio of the number of collisions in a model and the size of the universe. Therefore we need to take a more abstract
approach for extending our framework to analyse infinite frames adequately. To this end, we introduce the macrotypes
poset.
Definition 23. The macrotypes poset is a poset (m, {∞,∞⊥}) where ∞ m ∞⊥ We call m the macrotype
ordering and we call {∞,∞⊥} the macrotypes.
For each bistructure with an infinite domain, we assign a macrotype as follows.
Definition 24. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols and let E be a bistructure such that |Domain(E)| ℵ0. The Mac
function is defined as follows:
If
∣∣Domain(E)∣∣ ℵ0, and CollisionCount(Π,E) < ℵ0, then Mac(Π,E)= ∞
If
∣∣Domain(E)∣∣ ℵ0, and CollisionCount(Π,E) ℵ0, then Mac(Π,E)= ∞⊥
Intuitively, for the macrotypes, the superscript  denotes the bistructure is “overwhelmingly consistent”, and the
superscript ⊥ denotes the bistructure is “substantially inconsistent”.
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then Mac(Π,E)= ∞⊥.
Example 23. Let Δ = {∀x.P (x),Q(a)∧¬Q(a)}, Π = {P }, and E ∈ Models(Δ). If Domain(E) = N or Domain(E) =
R, then Mac(Π,E)= ∞.
Now we can provide a measure of inconsistency for infinite frames. The definition takes a credulous view by using
the bistructure in the frame with the minimum inconsistency according to the macrotype ordering.
Definition 25. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols, and Φ an infinite frame. Let Infinite(Φ) = {E ∈ Φ | |D|  ℵ0},
where D is the domain of E. The infinite degree of inconsistency of (Π,Φ), denoted MacroInc(Π,Φ), is defined as
follows.
For E ∈ Infinite(Φ),
if ∀E′ ∈ Infinite(Φ)(Mac(Π,E)m Mac(Π,E′)),
then MacroInc(Π,Φ) = Mac(Π,E)
In order to better illustrate the measurement of the infinite degree of inconsistency, we consider some simple
examples of knowledgebases for representing and reasoning with temporal knowledge.
Example 24. For Δ = {∀x.(x  5) → ¬P(x),∀x.P (x)} and Π = {P },
MacroInc
(
Π,CPModels(Δ)
)= ∞
MacroInc
(
Π,CIModels(Δ)
)= ∞⊥
The infinite degree of inconsistency is a function that is monotonic in one argument and antimonotonic in the other
argument, as captured by the following results.
Proposition 11. If Π ′ ⊆ Π , and Φ is an infinite frame, then MacroInc(Π ′,Φ) m MacroInc(Π,Φ).
Proof. Assume Π ′ ⊆ Π . So, for all E ∈ Φ , CollisionCount(Π ′,E)  CollisionCount(Π,E). Therefore, for all E ∈
Infinite(Φ), Mac(Π ′,E)m Mac(Π,E). Therefore, MacroInc(Π ′,Φ)m MacroInc(Π,Φ). 
Proposition 12. If Φ ′ ⊆ Φ , and Φ and Φ ′ are infinite frames, then MacroInc(Π,Φ)m MacroInc(Π,Φ ′).
Proof. Assume Φ ′ ⊆ Φ . For all E′ ∈ Φ ′, there is an E ∈ Φ (namely E′), such that CollisionCount(Π,E) 
CollisionCount(Π,E′). So for all E′ ∈ Infinite(Φ ′), there is an E ∈ Infinite(Φ), such that Mac(Π,E)m Mac(Π,E′).
Therefore, MacroInc(Π,Φ)m MacroInc(Π,Φ ′). 
For knowledgebases Δ that are consistent by classical logic (i.e. Δ  ⊥) we have the following result for the infinite
degree of inconsistency.
Proposition 13. Let Δ be a knowledgebase and let Π be a set of predicate symbols. If Δ  ⊥, then MacroInc(Π,
Models(Δ)) = ∞.
Proof. If Δ  ⊥, then there is a model E ∈ Infinite(Models(Δ)) such that CollisionCount(Π,E) = 0. Hence,
MacroInc(Π,Models(Δ)) = ∞. 
Similarly, if a knowledgebase is “completely inconsistent”, then we have the following result for the infinite degree
of inconsistency.
Proposition 14. Let Δ be a knowledgebase and let Π be a set of predicate symbols. If for all E ∈ Finite(Models(Δ)),
Inc(Π,E)= 1, then MacroInc(Π,Models(Δ)) = ∞⊥.
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all E ∈ Finite(Φ), E |= ∀x1, . . . , xk.P (x1, . . . , xk) ∧ ¬P(x1, . . . , xk) for all P ∈ Π . Hence, for all E ∈ Infinite(Φ),
CollisionCount(Π,E) ℵ0. Therefore, MacroInc(Π,Models(Δ)) = ∞⊥. 
The following result shows that for any knowledgebase Δ, there is a “continuity” of the measurement of inconsis-
tencies going from the subframe Finite(Models(Δ)) to the subframe Infinite(Models(Δ)).
Theorem 4. Let Δ be a knowledgebase and let Φ = Models(Δ). If (Π,Φ) is k-inconsistent in the limit, and k > 0,
then MacroInc(Π,Φ)= ∞⊥.
Proof. By Theorem 1, (Π,Φ) is a smooth frame. Let (Π,Φ) be k-inconsistent in the limit and let k ∈ (0,1]. Therefore
there exists a discord function f ΦΠ (n) and polynomials b0 +b1n+b2n2 +· · ·+bpnp and c0 +c1n+c2n2 +· · ·+cqnq ,
q  p, such that for all n > n0,
hΦΠ(n) = f ΦΠ (n) =
c0 + c1n+ c2n2 + · · · + cqnq
b0 + b1n+ b2n2 + · · · + bpnp =
r1(n)
r2(n)
where
k = lim
n→∞
c0 + c1n+ c2n2 + · · · + cqnq
b0 + b1n+ b2n2 + · · · + bpnp
Since k > 0, it follows that q = p. As shown in Proposition 8, the only way this is possible is if we have at least one
arity p predicate symbol P ∈ Π for which for all E ∈ Φ , E |= ∀x1 . . . xp.P (x1, . . . , xp) ∧ ¬P(x1, . . . , xp). Now, if
we consider any E ∈ Infinite(Models(Δ)), then CollisionCount(Π,E) ℵ0 and so MacroInc(Π,Φ) = ∞⊥. 
However, if Φ is k-inconsistent in the limit, and k = 0, then it is not necessarily the case that MacroInc(Π,Φ) =
∞, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 25. Consider a language that has a unary predicate P1 and a binary predicate P2. Let Δ = {∀x.P1(x) ∧
¬P1(x)}. Here Φ is 0-inconsistent in the limit but MacroInc(Π,Φ) = ∞⊥ for Π = {P1,P2}.
7. Framework for measuring consistency
We can extend our analysis of inconsistency by also measuring “harmonies”. We view this as the complement to
CollisionCount(Π,E), as explicated in the following definition for harmony.
Definition 26. Let E be a bistructure, where D = Domain(E) and let Π be a set of predicate symbols.
HarmonyCount(Π,E)=
∑
Pi∈Π
∣∣Harmony(Pi,E)∣∣
where for each arity n predicate symbol Pi , Harmony(Pi,E)= Dn \ Collision(Pi,E)
We can now use HarmonyCount(Π,E) as a second dimension, along with CollisionCount(Π,E), to compare mod-
els. We can use this for both finite models and infinite models, but for finite models, with CollisionCount(Π,E), we
can calculate HarmonyCount(Π,E), whereas for infinite models, we cannot calculate HarmonyCount(Π,E) from
CollisionCount(Π,E).
Consider a finite model with 5 elements for a language with a unary predicate R1 and a binary predicate R2. There
are 5 atoms for R1 and 25 for R2, altogether there are 30 atoms. Suppose that for this model there are 4 collisions.
Then there must be 30 − 4 = 26 “harmonies”. There is no need to deal separately with the number 26 because if
another finite model with 5 elements for the same language has 3 collisions, it must have 27 harmonies and the second
dimension is irrelevant for comparing harmonies.
The situation is different for infinite models. Suppose an infinite model for the same language has infinitely many
collisions. That does not tell us how many harmonies there are. Furthermore, suppose that D1 has infinitely many
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collisions and infinitely many harmonies. It would be very reasonable to say that D3 is the least inconsistent model,
D2 is next, and D1 is the most inconsistent. To capture this idea, we require the following notion of a profile.
For the rest of this section, we will only deal with infinite bistructures.
Definition 27. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols, and E a bistructure. The profile of (Π,E), denoted Pro(Π,E), is
defined as follows.
Pro(Π,E)= 〈CollisionCount(Π,E),HarmonyCount(Π,E)〉
Using the profile function, we define an ordering relation over profiles as follows.
Definition 28. Let Π be a set of predicate symbols, and E1 and E2 bistructures. If Pro(Π,E1) = 〈a1, b1〉 and
Pro(Π,E2) = 〈a2, b2〉, then the profile ordering, denoted Π , is defined as follows.
E1 Π E2 iff a1  a2 and b2  b1
Also let E1 <Π E2 denote that E1 Π E2, and E2 Π E1, and let E1 ∼Π E2 denote that E1 Π E2, and E2 Π E1.
So if E1 Π E2, then E1 is less inconsistent than, or equally inconsistent with, E2.
Example 26. Let E1 = (D1, I+1 , I−1 ), E2 = (D2, I+2 , I−2 ), and E3 = (D3, I+3 , I−3 ) be such that D1 = D2 = D3 = N
and
I+1 (P ) =
{〈1〉, 〈2〉, 〈3〉, . . .} I−1 (P ) = {〈1〉, 〈2〉, 〈3〉, . . .}
I+1 (Q) =
{〈1〉, 〈2〉} I−1 (Q) = {}
I+2 (P ) =
{〈1〉, 〈2〉, 〈3〉, . . .} I−2 (P ) = {〈1〉, 〈2〉, 〈3〉, . . .}
I+2 (Q) =
{〈1〉, 〈2〉, 〈3〉, . . .} I−2 (Q) = {〈6〉, 〈7〉, 〈8〉, . . .}
I+3 (P ) =
{〈1〉, 〈2〉, 〈3〉, . . .} I−3 (P ) = {〈1〉, 〈2〉, 〈3〉, . . .}
I+3 (Q) =
{〈1〉, 〈2〉, 〈3〉, . . .} I−3 (Q) = {〈2〉, 〈3〉, 〈4〉, . . .}
Hence,
CollisionCount
({P },E1)= ℵ0 HarmonyCount({P },E1)= 0
CollisionCount
({Q},E1)= 0 HarmonyCount({Q},E1)= ℵ0
CollisionCount
({P,Q},E1)= ℵ0 HarmonyCount({P,Q},E1)= ℵ0
CollisionCount
({P },E2)= ℵ0 HarmonyCount({P },E2)= 0
CollisionCount
({Q},E2)= ℵ0 HarmonyCount({Q},E2)= 5
CollisionCount
({P,Q},E2)= ℵ0 HarmonyCount({P,Q},E2)= 5
CollisionCount
({P },E3)= ℵ0 HarmonyCount({P },E3)= 0
CollisionCount
({Q},E3)= ℵ0 HarmonyCount({Q},E3)= 1
CollisionCount
({P,Q},E3)= ℵ0 HarmonyCount({P,Q},E3)= 1
So for Π = {P }, E1 ∼Π E2 and E2 ∼Π E3. And for Π ′ = {P,Q}, E1 <Π ′ E2 and E2 <Π ′ E3.
We now focus on a particular class of frames, called equiframes, that are defined next.
Definition 29. A frame Φ is an equiframe iff for all Ei,Ej ∈ Φ , Domain(Ei) = Domain(Ej ).
In the following, we consider equiframes Φ for which each E ∈ Φ is such that |Domain(E)| = ℵ0, and give a
definition for a profile for such equiframes. Some examples are given in Examples 27–30. We can consider alternative
types of equiframes, for example equiframes Φ for which each E ∈ Φ is such that Domain(E) = [0,1], in a similar
way.
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an index set and the domain cardinality is ℵ0. Let Pro(Π,Ei) = 〈ai, bi〉 for all i ∈ I . Let a = Min({ai | i ∈ I }) and let
b =
{
Max({bi | i ∈ I }) if it exists
ℵ0 otherwise
The profile of (Π,Φ) is defined as Pro(Π,Φ)= 〈a, b〉.
Example 27. For Δ1 = {∀x.P (x),∀x.(x  6) → ¬P(x)}, let Φ1 = CPModels(Δ1). So Pro({P },Φ1) = 〈6,ℵ0〉.
Example 28. For Δ2 = {∀x.P (x),∀x.¬P(x)}, let Φ2 = CPModels(Δ2). So Pro({P },Φ2) = 〈ℵ0,0〉.
Example 29. For Δ3 = {∀x.P (x),∀x.Q(x)∧ ¬Q(x)}, let Φ3 = CPModels(Δ3).
Pro
({P },Φ3)= 〈0,ℵ0〉
Pro
({Q},Φ3)= 〈ℵ0,0〉
Pro
({P,Q},Φ3)= 〈ℵ0,ℵ0〉
Example 30. For Δ4 = {∀x.P (x)}, let Φ4 = CPModels(Δ4). So Pro({P },Φ4) = 〈0,ℵ0〉.
Example 31. Let Φ5 be the frame {Ei | i ∈ N} where Ei = (N, I+i , I−i ) for i = 1,2,3, . . . defined by I+i (P ) =
{〈1〉, 〈2〉, 〈3〉, . . .} and by I−i (P ) = {〈i + 1〉, 〈i + 2〉, 〈i + 3〉, . . .}. This means that for all i = 1,2,3, . . .
CollisionCount({P },Ei) = ℵ0 and HarmonyCount({P },Ei) = i. This is where we need to use the second line in
the definition of b in Definition 30, and find that Pro({P },Φ5) = 〈ℵ0,ℵ0〉, even though no Ei has infinitely many
harmonies.
We can compare profiles using the following profile ranking.
Definition 31. If Pro(Π1,Φ1) = 〈a1, b1〉, and Pro(Π2,Φ2) = 〈a2, b2〉, then the profile ranking is defined as follows:
Pro(Π1,Φ1)  Pro(Π2,Φ2) iff a1  a2 and b2  b1
Let Pro(Π1,Φ1) ≺ Pro(Π2,Φ2) denote that Pro(Π1,Φ1)  Pro(Π2,Φ2) and Pro(Π2,Φ2)  Pro(Π1,Φ1) and
Pro(Π1,Φ1)∼Pro(Π2,Φ2) denote that Pro(Π1,Φ1)  Pro(Π2,Φ2) and Pro(Π2,Φ2)  Pro(Π1,Φ1).
Clearly,  defines a total order.
Example 32. Using Examples 27–30, we get the following profile ranking.
Pro
({P },Φ3)∼ Pro({P },Φ4)≺ Pro({P },Φ1)
≺ Pro({P,Q},Φ3)∼ Pro({P },Φ5)≺ Pro({Q},Φ3)∼ Pro({P },Φ2)
In general, for an equiframe Φ that is a set of models from a knowledgebase Δ, such as CPModels(Δ), Pro(Π,Φ)
is minimal in the  ranking when Δ is consistent, and Pro(Π,Φ) is maximal in the  ranking when for each E ∈ Φ ,
for all predicates P ∈ Π , E |= ∀x1, . . . , xk.P (x1, . . . , xk)∧ ¬P(x1, . . . , xk).
Proposition 15. For equiframes Φ1 and Φ2, if Φ1 ⊆ Φ2, then Pro(Π,Φ2)  Pro(Π,Φ1).
Proof. Let Pro(Π,Φ1) = 〈a1, b1〉 and Pro(Π,Φ2) = 〈a2, b2〉. Also let I1 be the index set for Φ1 and let I2 be the index
set for Φ2. Since Φ1 ⊆ Φ2, we have that I1 ⊆ I2. So by Definition 30, a2  a1 and b1  b2. Therefore, Pro(Π,Φ2) 
Pro(Π,Φ1). 
So increasing an equiframe Φ monotonically decreases Pro(Π,Φ) in the  ordering. However increasing Π
neither monotonically increases nor decreases Pro(Π,Φ) in the  ordering, as we show by referring to Example 32
for Φ3 where Pro({P },Φ3) ≺ Pro({P,Q},Φ3) ≺ Pro({Q},Φ3).
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inconsistent first-order knowledgebases. As we discussed above, for finite domains, we can determine the harmonies
for a bistructure from the collisions, but for infinite domains this is not possible. So for finite domains, harmony count
can be made explicit, and for infinite domains, harmony count provides further useful information for evaluating and
comparing inconsistent knowledgebases as illustrated in Examples 27–31. Furthermore, using the profile ranking (as
illustrated in Example 32), we may for example choose a knowledgebase for which its set of models are minimal in
the profile ranking, if we are seeking better (i.e. less conflicting and more harmonious) sources of information.
8. Tolerant logic generalises Belnap’s logic
We now compare our presentation of tolerant logic with Belnap’s four-valued logic. We only deal with the ground
portion of FOL, because Belnap’s four-valued logic is propositional. Let G ⊆ Formulae(L) be the set of ground
formulae in L that involve the ¬, ∨ and ∧ symbols. So if θ ∈ G, then θ contains no variable symbols nor any quantifier
symbols. An interpretation in Belnap’s four-valued logic is a truth assignment t that for the atoms of G assigns a value
in {T ,F,N,B}, and for an arbitrary formula θ ∈ G, t (θ) is defined by the truth tables for Belnap’s four-valued logic
given in Tables 1 to 3. The lattice ordering is given as B > T , B > F , T > N , and F >N . In particular, t (θ) T iff
t (θ) = B or t (θ) = T .
Definition 32. Let t be a Belnap truth assignment, t :G → {T ,F,N,B}, and let E be a bistructure. t represents E for
all atoms in G iff for all atoms α ∈ G, the following constraints hold for t and E.
t (α) = N iff E |= α and E |= ¬α
t(α) = F iff E |= α and E |= ¬α
t(α) = T iff E |= α and E |= ¬α
t(α) = B iff E |= α and E |= ¬α
For θ ∈ G, the satisfaction relation for tolerant logic, given by |=, coincides with the semantics for Belnap’s four-
valued logic as shown by the following result.
Table 1
Truth table for negation
α N F T B
¬α N T F B
Table 2
Truth table for conjunction
∧ N F T B
N N F N F
F F F F F
T N F T B
B F F B B
Table 3
Truth table for disjunction
∨ N F T B
N N N T T
F N F T B
T T T T T
B T B T B
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E for A. For θ ∈ G,
t (θ) T iff E |= θ
Proof. By induction on the length of a formula. The base case is where θ is a literal. Then t (θ)  T iff E |= θ by
Definition 32. For the induction we assume the inductive hypothesis that t (α) T iff E |= α and t (β) T iff E |= β .
The following 5 cases exhaust all the possibilities and complete the proof.
Case 1: θ is of the form α ∧ β .
t (α ∧ β) T iff t (α) T and t (β) T by Table 2
iff E |= α and E |= β by the inductive hypothesis
iff E |= α ∧ β by Definition 5
Case 2: θ is of the form α ∨ β .
t (α ∨ β) T iff t (α) T or t (β) T by Table 3
iff E |= α or E |= β by the inductive hypothesis
iff E |= α ∨ β by Definition 5
Case 3: θ is of the form ¬(α ∧ β).
t
(¬(α ∧ β)) T iff t (α ∧ β) F by Table 1
iff t (α) F or t (β) F by Table 2
iff t (¬α) T or t (¬β) T by Table 1
iff E |= ¬α or E |= ¬β by the inductive hypothesis
iff E |= ¬(α ∧ β) by Definition 5
Case 4: θ is of the form ¬(α ∨ β).
t
(¬(α ∨ β)) T iff t (α ∨ β) F by Table 1
iff t (α) F and t (β) F by Table 3
iff t (¬α) T and t (¬β) T by Table 1
iff E |= ¬α and E |= ¬β by the inductive hypothesis
iff E |= ¬(α ∨ β) by Definition 5
Case 5: θ is of the form ¬¬α.
t (¬¬α) T iff t (α) T by Table 1
iff E |= α by the inductive hypothesis
iff E |= ¬¬α by Definition 5 
Whilst Belnap’s four-valued logic is a simple, intuitive and well-known proposal, there are some interesting, though
more complex proposals, that are variants of Belnap’s proposal, such as a proposal by Arieli and Avron that has a
preferential semantics which selects those models for a knowledgebase that are minimal with respect to the assignment
of the B truth value [1]. These variants on Belnap’s proposal may offer some useful developments of the framework
for analysing inconsistent information presented in this paper.
9. Discussion
The need to develop robust, but principled, logic-based techniques for analysing inconsistent information is in-
creasingly recognised as an important research area for artificial intelligence in particular, and for computer science
in general. This interest stems from the recognition that the dichotomy between consistent and inconsistent set of
formulae that comes from classical logics is not sufficient for describing inconsistent information.
A number of proposals have been made for measuring the degree of information in the presence of inconsistency
[24,26,29,37], and for measuring the degree of inconsistency in information [14,15,18,20–22,24–26]. For a review
see [17].
1092 J. Grant, A. Hunter / Artificial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1064–1093These measures are potentially important in diverse applications in artificial intelligence, such as belief revision,
belief merging, negotiation, multi-agent systems, decision-support, and software engineering tools. Already, measur-
ing inconsistency has been seen to be a useful tool in analysing a diverse range of information types including news
reports [23], integrity constraints [14], information merging [34], ontologies [32], software specifications [8,30], and
ecommerce protocols [10].
The current proposals for measuring inconsistency can be classified in two ways. The first approach involves
“counting” the minimal number of formulae needed to produce the inconsistency. The more formulae needed to
produce the inconsistency, the less inconsistent the set [25]. This idea is an interesting one, but it rejects the possibility
of a more fine-grained inspection of the (content of the) formulae. In particular, if one looks to singleton sets only, one
is back to the initial problem, with only two values: consistent or inconsistent.
The second approach (which includes the proposal presented in this paper) involves looking at the proportion of
the language that is touched by the inconsistency. This allows us to look inside the formulae [14,20,24]. This means
that two formulae (singleton sets) can have different inconsistency measures. In these proposals one can identify the
set of formulae with its conjunction (i.e. the set {ϕ,ϕ′} has the same inconsistency measure as the set {ϕ ∧ ϕ′}). This
means that the distribution of the contradiction among the formulae is not taken into account.
Recently, there has been a proposal to combine the first and second approaches in a unified framework [18].
The framework, based on coalitional game theory, supports inconsistency measures that are able to look inside the
formulae, but also to take into account the distribution of the contradiction among the different formulae of the set,
allowing for the identification of the blame/responsibility of each formula of the knowledgebase in the inconsistency.
All the proposals discussed above are based on propositional logic, apart from [15], which deals mainly with
infinite models, and [14] which is based on a restricted form of first-order logic. So the proposal in this paper, based
on tolerant logic, is the first proposal for measuring inconsistency in first-order knowledge. This potentially offers
considerable advantages for applications in artificial intelligence and computer science involving first-order logic.
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